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ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS OF CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS: EVIDENTIARY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
Federal courts disagree over the nature and degree of interference with
a criminal defense by government agents that an accused must show to
establish a violation of his sixth amendment right to counsel. ' Courts
agree, however, that the right to counsel requires government agents to
respect the privacy of communications between an accused individual
and his attorney.2 The attorney-client privilege also protects defense
preparations by preventing courts from compelling clients and attorneys
to disclose their confidential communications.3 Although courts have
recognized an interrelationship between the privilege and the right and
between the protections they provide,4 few courts have attempted to
identify precisely the interaction of these protections.5 Such a determina-
tion would aid in defining the limits of permissible governmental intru-
sion upon attorney-defendant communications and provide a basis upon
which to reconcile the differing views of the federal courts on the issue.
This Note proposes a resolution of current conflicts regarding the de-
1. Compare, e.g., Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d 486, 494-45 (prosecutorial knowledge of de-
fense strategy obtained through governmental intrusion upon attorney-client confidences constitutes
prejudicial violation of defendant's sixth amendment rights), vacated on other grounds, 712 F.2d
1444 (D.C. Cir. 1983) with United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980) (defendant's
sixth amendment rights violated only when prosecution actually uses confidential information
gained through government intrusion). For a more detailed discussion of current conflicts in sixth
amendment interpretation, see infra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.
2. Eg., Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 679-83 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1003 (1981);
United States v. Brugnian, 655 F.2d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d
1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974); United States v. In re Warrant Author-
izing Interception of Oral Communications, 521 F. Supp. 190, 197 (D.N.H. 1981), vacated on other
grounds, 673 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1982); Pobliner v. Fogg, 438 F. Supp. 890, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
3. For a discussion of the boundaries of the protection afforded by the attorney-client privi-
lege, see infra notes 12-20 & 40 and accompanying text.
4. Eg., Bishop v. Rose, 701 F.2d 1150, 1157 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Melvin, 650
F.2d 641, 645 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 1978); Beckler v.
Superior Court, 568 F.2d 661, 662 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1978). For other discussions of this interrelation-
ship, see Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States at 24 n. 13, Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545
(1977); Memorandum of Amici Curiae Regarding Invasion of Joint Defense at 5, United States v.
Pioggia, Cr. No. 82-231-K (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 1983), appeal docketed sub nom., United States v.
Barkett, Cr. No. 84-1029 (1st Cir. Jan. 12, 1984).
5. See, e.g., Beckler v. Superior Court, 568 F.2d 661, 662 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1978). But see
United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 645 (5th Cir. 1981) (privilege provides exact contours of
right's requirement of confidentiality).
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marcation of permissible and impermissible governmental intrusions
upon confidential communications between the criminally accused and
their attorneys. Part One of this Note presents the law governing the
attorney-client privilege6 and the sixth amendment right to counsel7 in
federal courts. Part Two sets forth both the distinctions and similarities
between the protections afforded by the privilege and the right.' These
distinctions and similarities provide a basis for formulating the standard
that courts should employ when deciding whether government intercep-
tions of attorney-client confidences violate the sixth amendment. In
Parts Three and Four this Note concludes that the right to counsel
should prohibit all prosecutorial knowledge of confidential attorney-
criminal defendant communications9 and that the courts should disre-
gard the question whether government agents deliberately intercepted
the communications.10
I. THE EVIDENTIARY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS OF
ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege prevents involuntary disclosure in court
of confidential attorney-client communications. The generally recog-
nized 1 parameters of the attorney-client privilege provide as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought 2 (2) from a professional
6. See infra notes 11-42 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 43-88 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 89-124 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 125-46 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 131-41 and accompanying text.
11. When federal law governs, principles of the common law determine the boundaries of the
attorney-client privilege. FED. R. EVID. 501. The federal courts generally rely upon Wigmore's
encapsulation of the principles of the privilege. See infra text accompanying notes 12-19; United
States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 538 n.9 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1927 (1984); In
re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 281 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314,
319 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963); Bouscher v. United States, 316 F.2d 451,
457 (8th Cir. 1963). Occasionally, courts refer to a restatement of the privilege, similar to Wig-
more's, set forth in United States v. United Shoe Mfg. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950). See United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928, 938 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978);
Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977). For a listing of state codifica-
tions of the privilege, see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 55 n.2 (J. McNaughton rev. ed,
1961).
12. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 95, at 199-201
(2d ed. 1972); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, §§ 2294-96, 2298-99, at 558-66, 572-80. The privilege
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legal advisor in his capacity as such,1 3 (3) the communications relating to
that purpose, 4 (4) made in confidence15 (5) by the client,16 (6) are at the
client's instance permanently protected17 (7) from disclosure by the client
or by the legal advisor," (8) except when the client waives the protec-
tion.19 Federal courts also extend the privilege to confidential communi-
cations from attorney to client which, if disclosed, arguably could reveal
privileged client communications.2 °
does not protect, however, a client who seeks advice relating to his involvement in an ongoing or
future illegal act. C. MCCORMICK, supra, § 95, at 199; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, §§ 2298-99, at
572-80.
13. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 88, at 179-82; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, §§ 2300-05,
at 580-87. Generally, the client must believe that he is consulting an attorney and must manifest his
intent to seek professional advice. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 88, at 179; 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 11, §§ 2296-97, at 566-72.
14. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, §§ 89-90, at 182-87; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, §§ 2306-
10, at 588-99. Acts as well as words can constitute communication. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12,
8 89, at 183-84. The privilege protects written and oral communications, including documents ex-
isting prior to the creation of the attorney-client relationship which were privileged on other grounds
when the client transferred them to the attorney. Id. § 89, at 185. See also Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391 (1976). While the attorney does not have to disclose communicated facts, the client
may only refuse to disclose that he communicated these facts; the underlying facts are not privileged.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 89, at 183-84. Neither the fact of employment nor the identity of
the attorney or the client constitute privileged matters. Id. § 90 at 185.
15. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 91, at 187-91; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, §§ 2311-16,
at 599-618. The client must either expressly demand or reasonably assume confidentiality. C. MC-
CORMICK, supra note 12, § 91, at 188. The presence of a third party during the communication does
not automatically negate confidentiality. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 (1977). When a
third party is present, courts ask whether confidentiality remained a reasonable assumption and
whether the presence of the third party was reasonably necessary, such as for the purpose of prepar-
ing a joint defense. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 91, at 189-90.
16. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, §§ 89-90, at 182-87; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, §§ 2317-
20, at 618-29. Certain communications from attorney to client are also privileged. See infra note 20
and accompanying text.
17. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 92, at 192-94; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, §§ 2321-23,
at 629-31. The protection of the privilege generally survives the client, except in cases involving the
validity or interpretation of the client's will. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 94, at 197.
18. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 87, at 175-79; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, §§ 2324-26,
at 631-34.
19. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 93, at 194-97; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, §§ 2327-29,
at 63441. Waiver may arise expressly from the client's intentions or implicitly from his actions. See
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 93, at 194-97; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, §§ 2327-29, at 634-41.
20. E.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v.
United States Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1977); In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209,
211 (9th Cir. 1977); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1096 n.7 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 974 (1971); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 833 (1956). McCormick observes that the protection of attorney communications is inconsis-
tent with the modern view that the promotion of client candor justifies the privilege. C. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 12, § 89, at 182-85. Apparently, courts tolerate this inconsistency to avoid
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Courts apply the privilege absolutely. Whenever a client demonstrates
that sought-after information properly comes within the scope of the
privilege's protection, a court will afford that protection. The client does
not need to show that disclosure would prejudice his case.2
Although courts originally developed the privilege to protect the attor-
ney's honorable status in society,22 they currently justify it on the ground
that it is essential to a fair system of adjudication.23 The fair and efficient
administration of an adversary system of justice requires effective lawyer
performance, 24 which can result only when a client discloses all the infor-
inadvertent disclosure of privileged client communications. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v.
Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980). For an elaboration of the modem
justification for the privilege, see infra notes 23-34 and accompanying text.
21. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 40-41 and accompanying
text.
22. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2290, at 542-43. Originating in the late sixteenth century,
the privilege was "a consideration for the oath and the honor of the attorney rather than for the
apprehensions of his'client." Id. at 543 (emphasis original). Apparently this early justification for
the privilege derived from Roman law. Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Be-
tween Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 487-89 (1928). During the latter half of the
eighteenth century, courts decided that the benefits from the privilege failed to offset the social loss
resulting from the exclusion of relevant testimony. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2290, at 543.
Wigmore quoted one court's complete repudiation of the point of honor doctrine:
[I]f this point of honour was to be so sacred as that a man who comes by knowledge of this
sort from an offender was not to be at liberty to disclose it, the most atrocious criminals
would every day escape punishment; and therefore it is that the wisdom of the law knows
nothing of that point of honour.
Id. § 2286, at 531 n.16 (quoting Hill's Trial, 20 How. St. Tr. 1362 (1777)). Note that the cost of the
privilege is not as great in civil as in criminal cases, because in the latter, the combination of the
privilege and the fifth amendment allows both attorney and client to refuse to testify. See infra notes
28-34 and accompanying text. For a comprehensive discussion of the early history of the privilege,
see Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061
(1978).
23. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40, 51 (1980); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464,
470 (1888); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Buck-
ley, 586 F.2d 498, 502 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v.
United States Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 254 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1977); In re Fischel, 557 F.2d
209, 211 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 281 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 976 (1964); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 87, at 176; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2290,
at 543. See generally M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975).
As Wigmore indicates, the present form of the privilege differs from that of the original privilege
in three ways. First, the client, rather than the attorney, now asserts the privilege. Second, the
protection extends to all legal advice, rather than just that related to ongoing litigation. Third, the
attorney can no longer waive the privilege. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note I1, § 2290, at 544.
24. E.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (sound legal advice and advo-
cacy serves public interest in the administration of justice).
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mation that the attorney needs to give informed advice.25 Uninhibited
client disclosure occurs only when a client knows that a court cannot
compel either the attorney or the client to disclose the content of attor-
ney-client communications.26 In contrast, an incomplete privilege based,
for example, on a balancing of society's interest in arriving at an accurate
result against the desirability of client candor would inject uncertainty
into the client's mind, thereby discouraging candor.2 7 The fair and effi-
25. See, e.g., United States v. Buckley, 586 F.2d 498, 502 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[T]he policy behind
the attorney-client privilege. . .is to encourage the free-flowing communication and candid disclo-
sure so vitally necessary to effective representation by counsel"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979).
26. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888); see also In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 211 (9th
Cir. 1977) (purpose of privilege is to encourage client candor "without fear of future disclosures of
such confidences").
27. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation,
599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Buckley, 586 F.2d 498, 503 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979). Two arguments undermine the assertion that the need for certainty
justifies an absolute privilege. First, notwithstanding their awareness of the absolute privilege, pro-
spective clients naturally hesitate to be completely candid because of the difficulty in ascertaining
whether their communication will satisfy the strictly construed elements of the privilege. See infra
text accompanying note 40. Second, it is possible that some clients, though uncertain due to the lack
of an absolute privilege, would realize that the cost of withholding information from their attorney
would outweigh the risks of in-court disclosure. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed
Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 470-73 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Fixed Rules]. See generally Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other
Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226
(1962) (an empirical study on the effect of privilege upon client candor) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Functional Overlap].
Several commentators advocate a balancing approach. E.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 87,
at 175-79; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2285, at 527-28; Note, Fixed Rules, supra, at 473-77. A
balancing approach rests on the belief that the benefits of the privilege are often too speculative to
pursue, given the high cost of excluding evidence. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2291, at 554.
Contra Barnhart, Privilege in the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1963). Balanc-
ing is consistent with a privilege the purpose of which is to better the judicial system. The efficacy
and fairness of the system advance incrementally both when a court admits evidence to obtain a
more complete factual basis for decision, and when a court excludes evidence to encourage client
candor and thereby increase the efficacy of lawyers' representation. See Note, Fixed Rules, supra, at
470-73.
Unlike the balancing approach, an absolute privilege promotes the historical goal of preserving the
honorable status of the bar. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Admitting privileged evi-
dence is not an alternative means to such an end. Hence, there is no balance to strike. Thus, the
application of the privilege supports the argument that client candor is merely a benefit, whereas the
purpose of the privilege is the preservation of "the adversary system's sentiment of loyalty." C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 87, at 176.
Regardless of whether courts ultimately adopt a balancing approach, however, privileged commu-
nications also qualifying for sixth amendment protection will never be subjected to the uncertainty of
balancing. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942). Several commentators suggest
that the attorney-client privilege rises to the level of a constitutional right. See Seidelson, The Attor-
ney-Chent Privilege and Client's Constitutional Rights, 6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 693, 727 (1978); Note,
Washington University Open Scholarship
744 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 62:739
cient administration of an adversary system of justice, therefore, requires
the protection of confidential attorney-client communications from invol-
untary disclosure in court.z8
The adversary system's need for the attorney-client privilege is espe-
cially critical in the context of criminal prosecutions. Unlike the civil
Government Intrusions into the Defense Camp: Undermining the Right to Counsel, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1143, 1145 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Governmental Intrusions]; Note, Fixed Rules,
supra, at 485-87. These commentators mistake coextensive protection for equivalent legal signifi-
cance. Unlike a constitutional right, the privilege seeks to benefit the individual only as a means of
accomplishing a social purpose. See infra notes 100-101 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the
privilege and right to counsel afford protections of different scope, with different remedies. See infra
notes 109-22 and accompanying text. The privilege need not be elevated to constitutional status
because, as indicated by the overlapping protection of attorney-client communications by the privi-
lege and the right, the Constitution itself, by means of the sixth amendment, provides the protection
that the commentators attribute to the privilege. While the courts have observed that constitutional
protections incorporate privilege concepts, they have not identified a constitutionally guaranteed
privilege. See, eg., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 n.15 (1975); Bradt v. Smith, 634 F.2d 796,
800 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981); Beckler v. Superior Court, 568 F.2d 661, 662 (9th
Cir. 1978); OKC Corp. v. Williams, 461 F Supp. 540, 546 (N.D. Tex. 1978); cf. Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 402-05 (1976) (attorney-client privilege protects client's documents transferred
to attorney for purpose of seeking legal advice if the documents were, prior to transfer, protected by
client's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
28. This argument has not convinced all commentators on the merits of the attorney-client
privilege. A few scholars have challenged the privilege on its face, arguing that only the guilty need
its protection, of which they are undeserving. See, e.g., 5 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EVIDENCE 302-12 (1827); 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 473-79 (Bowring ed. 1843). Wig-
more responded to such arguments by observing that in civil actions, it is unlikely that one side is
absolutely guilty and the other absolutely blameless. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2291, at 552.
After considering both sides of the debate, McCormick found the privilege ultimately justified by the
adversary system and its inherent need for unencumbered loyalty by attorneys to their clients. C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 87, at 177.
Underlying McCormick's argument is the practical recognition that, while the societal benefits of
the privilege are speculative, see 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2291, at 554; contra Barnhart, supra
note 27, attorneys prosper because the privilege encourages prospective clients to seek counsel when
they might otherwise be afraid to discuss their affairs. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 87, at 177; 8
J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, § 2291, at 553. Furthermore, absent the privileges some lawyers con-
ceivably would choose not to remain in a profession in which courts would require them to betray
client confidences. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 87, at 177; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11,
§ 2291, at 553. The federal courts, however, have not adopted McCormick's argument, adhering
instead to the client candor justification. For an exceptional case, see United States v. Upjohn Co.,
600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1979) (privilege based both upon sentiment of loyalty and encouraging
candor), rev'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
If correct, McCormick's "necessity of loyalty" argument indicates that the actual rationale behind
the privilege has not changed since its origin. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Neverthe-
less, client candor would remain important as an incidental benefit tipping the societal cost-benefit
balance in favor of retaining the privilege. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. By articulating
client candor as an incidental benefit, rather than the purpose, of the privilege, courts could perhaps
undercut arguments in favor of a balancing approach to the privilege. See supra note 27.
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litigant, who, despite the privilege, remains subject to examination re-
garding underlying facts,29 the criminal defendant has the additional pro-
tection of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.30
Because the prosecution cannot compel the defense attorney to testify
regarding confidential communications, it has no direct access to facts
known only by the defendant unless the defendant waives his fifth
amendment privilege.31
Without the protection of the attorney-client privilege, by disclosing
incriminating information to his attorney, the defendant risks compelled
in-court disclosure by the attorney, which would vitiate his fifth amend-
ment rights.32 Alternatively, the accused could choose to withhold in-
criminating facts from his attorney, thereby rendering his attorney's
representation less effective, and undermining his sixth amendment
rights to effective counsel.3 3 Hence, absent protection of attorney-client
communications, the system impermissibly would force the criminal de-
fendant to choose one constitutional right at the expense of another.34
Notwithstanding the benefits that result from the privilege, a fair ad-
versary system of justice cannot justify the costs of the privilege in terms
of encouraging candor in a particular attorney-client relationship, or on
the "microcosmic" level.35 When an individual asserts the privilege in
court, he already has had an opportunity to be candid with his attorney;
attempts to encourage candor at this point would be mistimed.36 A fair
system can justify application of the privilege in a particular case only in
29. Eg., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981) (quoting City of Philadel-
phia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962)). See supra note 14.
30. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self.. ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
31. The prosecution, however, could still obtain information which neither the attorney-client
privilege nor the fifth amendment protect. See infra note 50.
32. Note, Fixed Rules, supra note 27, at 485-86 (criminal defendant, without attorney-client
privilege, would have to "surrender his testimony to the court" to gain effective representation).
33. See Seidelson, supra note 27, at 713; Note, Fixed Rules, supra note 27, at 485-86. Some
clients possibly would realize, however, that the costs of withholding information from their lawyer
outweigh the risk of compelled disclosure. Note, Fixed Rules, supra note 27, at 486 n.95.
34. The Supreme Court has found "intolerable" situations in which "one constitutional right
should have to be surrendered in order to assert another." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,
394 (1968).
35. This Note uses the term "microcosmic" as a concise reference to single attorney-client rela-
tionships in the context of single cases. Conversely, "macrocosmic" refers to attorney-client rela-
tionships collectively.
36. While exceptional situations may arise in which the client will decide during the trial to
"come clean" with his lawyer, legitimate efforts to encourage candor must begin at the onset of the
attorney-client relationship.
Number 4]
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terms of encouraging candor in all future attorney-client relationships, or
on the "macrocosmic" level.37  Potential clients, after observing that
courts do not compel disclosure of confidential attorney-client communi-
cations, are more likely to be frank with their attorneys. Society argua-
bly gains more from the resulting increase in fairness of its judicial
system than it loses from the inaccessibility of relevant testimony in par-
ticular cases.38
Because it renders relevant evidence unavailable, the privilege's micro-
cosmic pursuit of macrocosmic candor conflicts with the judicial sys-
tem's microcosmic pursuit of final resolutions based upon complete
factual records.39 To ease this conflict, courts strictly construe the privi-
lege to protect only disclosures that might not have been made but for
the privilege.' Despite this strict construction, however, courts will not
compel the disclosure of communications within the privilege's estab-
lished boundaries.41
In summary, the attorney-client privilege is an evidentiary privilege
operating within a distinct framework. By recognizing this privilege,
courts intend to enhance the efficacy and fairness of the adversary system
which they supervise. Hence, the microcosmic benefits of the privilege
are but means to a macrocosmic end. While courts prevent abuse of the
privilege by narrowly defining its parameters, they do not dilute its mac-
37. See supra note 35.
38. But see supra note 28 (criticisms of the privilege).
39. A similar tension arises in the context of exclusion of evidence on constitutional grounds.
See, eg., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412-16 (1984) (fourth amendment); Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26 (1971) (fifth amendment); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206-
07 (1964) (sixth amendment). Privileges hinder the fact-finding process to protect outside interests,
while exclusionary rules do so to protect the integrity of the fact-finding process itself. See C. MC-
CORMICK, supra note 12, § 92, at 192.
40. E.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 403 (1976); Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Mgt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir.
1981); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1979); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith,
572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 319
(7th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
41. E.g., Martin v. Lauer, 686 F.2d 24, 32-33 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 492-
93 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980); United States v. Buckley, 586 F.2d 498, 503 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979). Courts will deny government witnesses the privilege, how-
ever, when its exercise would unduly restrain the criminal defendant's right to cross-examination.
E.g., United States v. Coven, 662 F.2d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
Courts often state that the purpose of the privilege limits its scope. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas
Corp. v. Department ofEnergy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The formulation of the prereq-
uisites to assertion of the privilege, rather than a balancing test, provides the limitations.
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rocosmic benefits by requiring proof of prejudice or by subjecting claim-
ants to the uncertainties of a balancing process.42
B. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The sixth amendment guarantees the criminal defendant the right to
the assistance of counsel.43 Originally, the right to counsel meant only
that the accused could have an attorney conduct his defense.44 As prose-
cutors became more adroit, however, the Supreme Court recognized that
fair trials depended upon professional representation of all defendants,
including indigents. 45 The court further concluded that because the right
to the assistance of counsel would not guarantee a fair trial unless the
defendant received meaningful representation, "assistance" meant effec-
42. See supra note 27 (discussing balancing process).
43. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The fourteenth amendment extends the right
to counsel to defendants in state criminal proceedings. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342
(1963). The right only applies in criminal suits which may result in imprisonment. Scott v. Illinois,
440 U•S. 367, 373 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). It is operative from the
initiation of formal adversary proceedings, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977), through
and including the sentencing process, Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961). Prior to
adversary proceedings, the right to counsel arises from the fifth amendment protection against self-
incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 480 n.7 (1981) ("adversary criminal proceedings" are necessary to trigger the sixth amendment
right to counsel). For a discussion of the scope and application of the right to counsel, see Project:
Criminal Procedure, 71 GEo. L.J. 339, 589-92 (1982).
44. Eg., United States v. Van Dryce, 140 U.S. 169 (1891); Nabb v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 173
(1864). The sixth amendment encapsulated the American abandonment of the English common-law
rule forbidding the participation of counsel in criminal cases. See F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMEND-
MENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 109-10 (1969); Holtzoff, The Right to Coun-
sel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1-22 (1944).
45 See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2043-46 (1984); Strickland v. Washing-
ton, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984). In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Court stated:
[The right to counsel] embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average
defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before
a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by
experienced and learned Counsel. That which is simple, orderly and necessary to the law-
yer-to the untrained layman-may appear intricate, complex and mysterious. Consist-
ently with the wise policy of the Sixth Amendment and other parts of our fundamental
charter, this Court has pointed to ". . . the humane policy of the modern criminal law
I ." which now provides that a defendant ". . . if he be poor. . . may have counsel
furnished him by the state. . . not infrequently. . . more able than the attorney for the
state."
Id. at 462-63 (quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 308 (1930)). For similar expressions
regarding the necessity of lawyers in criminal cases, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344
(1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
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tive assistance."
The effectiveness of counsel's assistance depends both upon the partic-
ular lawyer's ability and upon whether the legal system allows the lawyer
to perform according to that ability.4 7 Thus, under the sixth amendment,
the accused can challenge either the adequacy of his attorney's ability
and efforts,48 or governmental interference with those efforts.4 9  If the
prosecution intercepts attorney-client communications that reveal de-
fense plans or the defendant's confidential inculpatory statements, it
gains an advantage that unconstitutionally undermines the defense coun-
sel's efforts to provide effective representation.50  The threat of
prosecutorial intrusion upon the defense camp also reduces client candor,
further diminishing the efficacy of defense representation. 5'
In Weatherford v. Bursey, the Supreme Court held that government
interception of attorney-client communications does not automatically
violate the sixth amendment.52 The Court recognized that the tension
46. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 76 (1942)).
47. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).
48. The adequacy of legal assistance exceeds the scope of this Note. The Supreme Court re-
quires proof of both deficit performance and sufficient prejudice to support a claim of ineffectiveness.
See Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2067, 2071 (1984); see also United States v. Cronic,
104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984).
49. For a discussion of government interference other than interception of attorney-client com-
munications, see Project, supra note 43, at 600 n.1813. See also United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct.
2039 (1984). Government conduct in the absence of counsel, after the commencement of adversary
proceedings, must stay within the limitations imposed by Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964), and its progeny.
50. E.g., Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d 486, 493-95, vacated on other grounds, 712 F.2d 1444
(D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. Costanzo, 625 F.2d 465, 469 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188, 1191 (9th Cir.
1975), cerL denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976). The prosecutor does, however, have certain powers of
discovery. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6, 12.1, 12.2, 15, 16, 17. See generally Allis, Limitations on
Prosecutorial Discovery of the Defense Case in Federal Courts: The Shield of Confidentiality, 50 S.
CAL. L. REv. 461 (1977).
51. See Note, Government Intrusions, supra note 27, at 1145-46. Unlike protection under the
attorney-client privilege, see supra notes 35-38 and accompany text, microcosmic protection of com-
munications constitutes an end of, rather than a means employed by, the right to counsel. Like the
attorney-client privilege protection, however, the right to counsel's microcosmic protection of com-
munications theoretically engenders macrocosmic candor, which in turn will enable the lawyer to
perform more effectively. For further discussion of the similarities and differences in the rationales
supporting protection of attorney-client communications by the attorney-client privilege and the
sixth amendment right to counsel, see infra notes 89-124 and accompanying text.
52. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 558 (1977). For arguments that Weatherford distorts
precedent so as to avoid a per se rule, thereby limiting the rights of the accused, see id. at 561-68
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Comment, Government Intrusion upon Attorney-Client Relationships-
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between the benefits of sixth amendment protection and its costs, specifi-
cally restraints upon investigation, required a more flexible approach. 3
Without adopting a precise analysis, the Court suggested several perti-
nent questions for courts to ask when determining whether the govern-
ment has committed an unconstitutional intrusion. 4
Weatherford's "suggested questions" consider both the purpose and
the resulting prejudice of an interception. Under "purpose," the Court
asked whether the government intentionally intercepted attorney-client
communications." The Court raised several questions concerning result-
ing prejudice: did the intruding agent testify as to the substance of over-
heard communications? 6 did the intruding agent inform the prosecutor
of overheard defense strategy?57 did government evidence stem from
overheard communications?58 did the government use overheard com-
munications to the substantial detriment of the accused?59 The Court
failed to indicate whether an affirmative response to only one of these
questions would support a claim of unconstitutional intrusion. °
Building upon the Supreme Court's suggestions in Weatherford, the
circuit courts have agreed that a prejudicial government intrusion upon
attorney-client communications61 violates the sixth amendment, whether
or not the intrusion is intentional. 62 Disagreement prevails, however, as
Weatherford v. Bursey, 27 DEPAUL L. REv. 203 (1977); Recent Decisions, 16 DUQ. L. REv. 269-82
(1977-78). Some state courts have circumvented Weatherford, imposing more exacting standards
based upon state constitutional provisions. See Comment, supra, at 215 n.84.
53. Although the Court recognized that a per se rule would provide the most effective prophy-
lactic against improper intrusions, it held that such a rule would unnecessarily impede legitimate
government undercover work. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 557 (1977).
54. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554, 558 (1977). See infra notes 55-60 and accompa-
nying text. The Weatherford Court did not confirm that it will find government interceptions of
attorney-client communications unconstitutional in the appropriate circumstances, but its language
implies such a position. 429 U.S. at 554.
55. 429 U.S. at 558.
56. Id. at 554, 558.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 554. The Court did not elaborate upon the phrase "substantial detrimental use."
60. The Court stated its suggested factors twice, once conjunctively and once disjunctively. Id.
at 554, 558. Although "purposeful intrusion" appears only in the conjunctive version, the Court
may then have been merely noting all of the circumstances absent under the facts of the case, rather
than establishing alternatively sufficient elements.
61. See infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text. The present discussion assumes that the
communications qualify for sixth amendment protection. For a discussion of the prerequisites to
sixth amendment protection, see infra notes 89-124 and accompanying text.
62. When knowledge is the only ground for finding prejudice, see infra notes 63-72 and accom-
panying text, the government may raise the defense of harmless error. See, eg., United States v.
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to what constitutes a prejudicial intrusion.
When the government intercepts defense strategy, the majority of
courts hold that the government's knowledge of such information consti-
tutes prejudice.6 3 The minority position rejects knowledge as the thresh-
old of prejudice, instead requiring proof that the government actually
used' the intercepted strategy to the substantial detriment of the ac-
cused.65 The split between a "knowledge" and a "use" threshold reflects
a dispute over the desirability of requiring the accused to establish that
government agents used their knowledge of defense plans.66
Franklin, 598 F.2d 954, 956-57 (5th Cir.) (information obtained was available from other sources),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979); United States v. Ostrer, 422 F. Supp. 93, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(information obtained did not affect prosecutorial actions). The Supreme Court has ruled that assist-
ance which is ineffective because of counsel incompetence can be harmless. See Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
63. The Third and the District of Columbia Circuits expressly hold that knowledge constitutes
prejudice. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d 486, 494-95, vacated on other grounds, 712 F.2d 1444
(D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 208-10 (3d Cir. 1978). Other circuits implic-
itly support this position. See United States v. Brugman, 655 F.2d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 1981) (consid-
ering whether government has learned details of trial preparation); United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d
1126, 1138 (Ist Cir. 1981) (to make colorable claim, accused need only allege government overheard
communications); United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1043 (suggests government knowledge of
privileged information sufficient), aff'd on other grounds, 615 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Franklin, 598 F.2d 954, 956 (5th Cir.) (knowledge of defense strategy may create sufficiently realistic
possibility of injury), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979); United States v. Peters, 468 F. Supp. 364,
365-68 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (proof that prosecutor listened to taped conversations regarding defense
strategy sufficient).
64. "Use" typically means the introduction of evidence originating in the overheard conversa-
tion. Weatherford, however, mentioned both evidentiary and other uses. Weatherford v. Bursey,
429 U.S. 545, 554 (1977). It may not be necessary for the use to alter trial results to constitute a
violation of the sixth amendment. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d 486, 494, vacated on other
grounds, 712 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1983). But see Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984)
(assistance which is ineffective because of counsel incompetence can be harmless).
65. United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980); Mastrain v. McManus, 554
F.2d 813, 821 & n.10 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 913 (1977); United States v Boffa, 89 F.R.D.
523, 533 (D. Del. 1981). The Sixth Circuit at least temporarily has adopted the "prejudicial use"
threshold. See Bishop v. Rose, 701 F.2d 1150, 1157 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Since the confidential informa-
tion was used [here] for the benefit of the prosecution and to the detriment of the defendant, it is
unnecessary for us to decide whether the communication of such information, without more, may
sufficiently- establish prejudice to support a finding of a Sixth Amendment violation.").
66. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d 486, 494-95, vacated on other grounds, 712 F.2d 1444
(D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 208-10 (3d Cir. 1978). The D.C. Circuit
stated: "The prosecution makes a host of discretionary and judgmental decisions in preparing its
case, and it would be virtually impossible to sort out how any particular piece of information...
was consciously factored into each of those decisions." Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d at 494-95. See
also United States v. Cooper, 397 F. Supp. 277, 284 (D. Neb. 1975) (dangers of subtle use either
evidentially or strategically). See generally Note, Government Intrusions, supra note 27.
Courts among the minority have not decided what constitutes a minimum level of prejudicial use.
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When the government intercepts nonstrategic information, few courts
hold that prosecutorial knowledge alone violates the sixth amendment.67
Instead, most courts require actual use of the intercepted information68
or take no position as to the necessity of showing prejudice resulting
from the use of nonstrategic information.69
Among the circuits ruling that knowledge establishes a prejudicial,
and thereby unconstitutional, intrusion, two schools of thought exist as
to which government representatives must know the information before
the accused suffers prejudice. The first considers knowledge by either
investigators or prosecutors sufficient.70  The second requires that the
prosecutor involved in the case receive the information.71 Within the
second school, the District of Columbia Circuit employs a rebuttable pre-
sumption that investigators passed the intercepted information along to
Consequently, these courts do not reject the possibility that the prosecutor's subconscious use of
defense strategy could qualify as a sufficiently prejudicial use. Rather, the minority courts require
objective evidence of subconscious prosecutorial use. See Bishop v. Rose, 701 F.2d 1150, 1157 (6th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980); Mastrain v. McManus, 554
F.2d 813, 821 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 913 (1977); United States v. Boffa, 89 F.R.D. 523, 533
(D. Del. 1981).
67. The Third and District of Columbia Circuits indicate that government knowledge of any
privileged information may violate the sixth amendment. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d 486,494-
95, vacated on other grounds, 712 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200,
208-10 (3d Cir. 1978). The Second Circuit suggests that it agrees. See United States v. Dien, 609
F.2d 1038, 1043, affd on other grounds, 615 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979).
68. See United States v. Brugman, 655 F.2d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Irwin,
612 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980); Mastrian v. McManus, 554 F.2d 813, 821 & n.10 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 913 (1977). See also Bishop v. Rose, 701 F.2d 1150, 1157 (6th Cir. 1983)
(perhaps only a temporary position; see supra note 63).
69. See United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126, 1138 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Franklin,
598 F.2d 954, 956 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
70. See United States v. Costanzo, 625 F.2d 465, 469 (3d Cir. 1980)(FBI's knowledge perhaps
sufficient); United States v. Franklin, 598 F.2d 954, 956 (5th Cir.) (must be at least an official as-
signed to the case), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979); United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 208-09
(3d Cir. 1978) (knowledge could affect either the investigation or the prosecution); United States v.
Orman, 417 F. Supp. 1126, 1136 (D. Colo. 1976) (accused prejudiced because agents can structure
their testimony on basis of knowledge even if they disclose nothing to the prosecution). In Weather-
ford, the Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's conclusion that an investigator's knowledge
was sufficient, on the basis of the trial court's express finding that the investigator did not pass
information to the prosecutor, and the limited scope of the investigator's testimony. Weatherford v.
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 556 (1977).
71. See Klein v. Smith, 559 F.2d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 987 (1978);
United States v. Natale, 494 F. Supp. 1114, 1125 (E.D. Pa. 1979), afl'd mem., 631 F.2d 726 (3d Cir.
1980); United States v. O'Neill, 484 F. Supp. 799, 801-2 (E.D. Pa.), affid mem, 639 F.2d 774 (3d
Cir. 1980); United States v. Meinster, 478 F. Supp. 1131, 1133 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
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the prosecution.72
The circuits also disagree over whether a deliberate73 government in-
trusion into attorney-client communications, absent prejudice, violates
the sixth amendment right to counsel. The Third Circuit finds deliberate
intrusion sufficient.74 The District of Columbia and Fifth Circuits seem
to agree.75  The Second, Eighth and Ninth Circuits require prejudice.7 6
An accused who proves a sixth amendment violation has several reme-
dies.77 The courts ordinarily will suppress the evidence78 or order a new
trial,79 depending upon the stage of the prosecution in which the intru-
sion is discovered. 0 Courts have also granted broader relief, such as dis-
72. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d 486, 495, vacated on other grounds, 712 F.2d 1444 (D.C.
Cir. 1983). The government may rebut the presumption by showing the existence of "Chinese wall"
procedures isolating the prosecutors from such information. Id. at 495 n.29. For cases involving
"Chinese wall" procedures, see United States v. Natale, 494 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aft'd
mem, 631 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. O'Neill, 484 F. Supp. 799 (E.D. Pa.), af'ld
mem., 639 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Meinster, 478 F. Supp. 1131 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
73. In this context, "deliberate" means that the government installs an electronic surveillance
device, or induces the presence of an informant. See United States v. Brugman, 655 F.2d 540, 546
(4th Cir. 1981). "Deliberate" intrusion does not include the self-initiated acts of an informant, see
United States v. Natale, 494 F. Supp. 1114, 1125 (E.D. Pa. 1979), affid mem., 631 F.2d 726 (3d Cir.
1980), the immunization of witnesses, see United States v. Griffin, 579 F.2d 1104, 1110 (8th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1979), or an independent decision by a codefendant to change his
plea to guilty and then to testify, see United States v. Kilrain, 566 F.2d 979, 983 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 819 (1979).
74. See United States v. Morales, 635 F.2d 177, 179 (3d Cir. 1980) (showing of intentional
government intrusion would support claim of per se violation without showing of prejudice); United
States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 210 (3d Cir. 1978) (finding of sixth amendment violation warranted
without showing of prejudice when government officials actively sought confidential information).
75. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d 486, 493 n.22 (intentional government intrusion may
violate sixth amendment per se), vacated on other grounds, 712 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United
States v. Franklin, 598 F.2d 954, 956 (5th Cir.) (dismissal of indictment inappropriate when
"[g]overnment did not purposely infiltrate the defense camp . . ."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870
(1979).
76. See United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 1980) (sixth amendment only
violated if government intrusion substantially prejudiced defendant); United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d
1038, 1043 (intentional invasion and resulting prejudice necessary to establish sixth amendment vio-
lation), af'd, 615 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979); Mastrian v. McManus, 554 F.2d 813, 821 (8th Cir.) (right
to counsel only violated if intercepted information actually benefited the prosecution), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 913 (1977). See also United States v. Tramunti, 425 F. Supp. 342, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(government intrusion must prejudice defendant to violate sixth amendment).
77. See generally Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1360, 1390-98 (1966).
78. See, eg., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1967); Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201, 207 (1964); see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 552 (1977) (dictum) (evidence
obtained in violation of the sixth amendment cannot be used in seeking conviction).
79. See, eg., O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345, 345 (1967); Black v. United States, 385
U.S. 26, 28-29 (1966).
80. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1980). In Morrison, the Court stated that
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missing of the indictment. t In United States v. Morrison,82 however, the
Supreme Court held that dismissal is usually too extreme a remedy, un-
less there exists a substantial threat of continued impairment of counsel's
ability to provide effective assistance.83 Despite Morrison, the circuits
occasionally order dismissal without finding continuing prejudice.84 A
constitutional violation also supports a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus."5 Finally, the accused may seek damages from the intruding
agent,86 or initiate contempt or criminal proceedings against that agent.87
Thus, the criminal defendant may challenge the admission of evidence,
a new trial is only warranted when the sixth amendment violation has already tainted the trial. Prior
to trial, suppression of the evidence usually provides a sufficient remedy. Id.
81. See, e.g.. United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 210 (3d Cir. 1978). In Levy, the court held
that the introduction of intercepted information into the public domain during trial necessitated
dismissal of the indictment. According to the court:
Any effort to cure the violation by some elaborate scheme . . . would involve . . . the
same sort of speculative enterprise . . . already rejected. Even if new case agents and
attorneys were substituted, we would still have to speculate about the effects of the old case
agents' discussions with key government witnesses. More important, public confidence in
the integrity of the attorney-client relationship would be ill-served . . . . We need not
decide whether dismissal would be required when defense strategy has been disclosed to
government agents but has not become public information.
Id See also United States v. Valencia, 541 F.2d 618, 623 (6th Cir. 1976) (dismissal of indictment
appropriate when prosecution learned of defendant's involvement by intercepting other defendant's
confidential communications); United States v. Peters, 468 F. Supp. 364, 366 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (de-
fense strategy intercepted); United States v. Orman, 417 F. Supp. 1126, 1136-37 (D. Colo. 1976)
(dismissal warranted because government agents could use intercepted defense strategy to alter their
testimony).
82. 449 U.S. 361 (1980).
83. Id. at 365-67. See also United States v. Sander, 615 F.2d 215, 219 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 835 (1980).
In Morrison the government did not intercept communications. Instead the "interference" con-
sisted of questioning the defendant without the presence of counsel, and suggesting to the defendant
that counsel was incompetent.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Gouveia, 704 F.2d 1116, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 104 S. Ct. 2292, 2297 n.4 (1984); see also United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 644 (5th
Cir. 1981) (Morrison does not foreclose dismissal). The drastic remedy of dismissal may successfully
deter future governmental intrusions, thereby increasing public confidence in the judicial system.
See Note, Government Interceptions of Attorney-Client Communications, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 87, 102
(1974). It also may so outrage the public as to offset any increase in confidence.
85. See Annot., supra note 77, at 1390.
86. When state agents violate the sixth amendment, those injured may sue for damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977); Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d
486, 496-97 (endorsing sixth amendment cause of action), vacated on other grounds, 712 F.2d 1444
(D.C. Cir. 1983). Similarly, there may be recourse against federal agents. See Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (cause of action for
damages implied under fourth amendment; suggests similar cause of action under sixth amendment).
87. See Annot., supra note 77, at 1398-99.
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the validity of a conviction, and in some cases the viability of an indict-
ment, on grounds of unconstitutional government interception of attor-
ney-client communications. Depending upon the jurisdiction, the
success of a sixth amendment claim hinges upon proof of an intentional
intrusion, government possession of attorney-client confidences, or gov-
ernment use of intercepted confidences. In all cases, however, the crimi-
nal defendant must first establish that the intercepted communications
qualify for sixth amendment protection. 88
II. COMPARISON OF EVIDENTIARY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS
A. Similarity of Protection Afforded
Although the attorney-client privilege and the right to counsel may
afford different degrees of protection, both protect attorney-client com-
munications to the extent of the less broad.8 9 In addition, some of the
prerequisites for the protections of the privilege and the right overlap
completely, suggesting possible cross-application of precedent.90
The common parameters of the attorney-client privilege and the sixth
amendment's protection of attorney-client communications are as fol-
lows:91 (1) Where legal advice pertaining to a pending criminal prosecu-
tion is sought92 (2) from a professional legal advisor acting in his capacity
as such,93 (3) the communications relating to that purpose, 94 (4) made in
88. See infra notes 89-124 and accompanying text.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 109-19. For example, a criminal defendant seeking legal
advice relating to a pending prosecution can invoke the protection of both the privilege and the right
as to communications pertaining to that purpose. See infra text accompanying notes 119-22.
90. See United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 645-46 (5th Cir. 1981) (application of privilege's
construction of confidentiality in right to counsel case); United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 209 (3d
Cir. 1978) (sixth amendment insulates all attorney-client confidences from the government enforce-
ment agencies responsible for investigating and prosecuting the case); see also United States v.
Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1329 (5th Cir.) (overstated breadth of United States v. Melvin as holding sixth
amendment protection extends to all communications protected by the attorney-client privilege),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 275 (1983). For a comparison of privilege and right waiver standards, see
infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
91. Wigrore's summary of the parameters of the attorney-client privilege provides the format
for this synopsis. See supra text accompanying notes 12-19.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 109-10. The protection of the right like that of the
privilege, see supra note 12, does not extend to communications regarding ongoing or contemplated
crimes. E.g., United States v. Valencia, 541 F.2d 618, 621 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. King,
536 F. Supp. 253, 264-65 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
93. Compare supra note 13 and accompanying text (existence of attorney-client relationship
necessary to invoke attorney-client privilege) with United States v. Costanzo, 625 F.2d 465, 468 (3d
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confidence95 (5) by the accused or the legal advisor,96 (6) are at the in-
stance of the client protected for the duration of the involved formal ad-
versary proceedings,97 (7) from disclosure by the accused or by the legal
advisory,9" (8) except upon waiver.99
B. Differences Between Protection Afforded
The attorney-client privilege and the right to counsel rest on different
theoretical underpinnings. Society grants a testimonial privilege to an
individual not for his benefit, but for the benefit of the public."° Thus
macrocosmic, not microcosmic, candor justifies the attorney-client privi-
lege.1°' Accordingly, courts strictly construe the availability of the privi-
lege,' °2 but afford its protections regardless of whether or not compelled
disclosure would prejudice the individual.10 3
In contrast, the sixth amendment affords the criminally accused an
Cir. 1980) (communications with "attorney-advisor" protected by sixth amendment); United States
v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 1975) (right to counsel protects confidential communica-
tions only in context of attorney-client relationship), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976); United States
v. Fanning, 477 F.2d 45, 48 (5th Cir.) (government intrusion into attorney-client relationship vio-
lates sixth amendment), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1006 (1973) and United States v. Alderisio, 424 F.2d
20, 24-25 (10th Cir. 1970) (government interception of communications between defendant and co-
defendant's attorney does not violate right to counsel). But see United States v. Valencia, 541 F.2d
618, 621-22 (6th Cir. 1976) (protection of sixth amendment extends to defendants prejudiced by
government interception of codefendant's communications with attorney).
94. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
95, Confidentiality is a prerequisite to protection of both the attorney-client privilege, see supra
note 15 and accompanying text, and the right to counsel, see United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315,
1329 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 275 (1983); United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 645-46
(5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Freeman, 519 F.2d 67, 68 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Gartner,
518 F.2d 633, 637-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 915 (1975); United States v. King, 536 F. Supp.
253, 265-66 (C.D. Cal. 1982). Courts may ignore the requirement of confidentiality, however, if a
confined accused had no opportunity to converse with his attorney privately. See infra note 124.
96. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345,
364-66 (7th Cir. 1972) (government interception of attorney-client confidences communicated
through intermediaries violates sixth amendment). But see United States v. Mancusco, 378 F.2d
612, 618 (government interrogation of defendant's accountant, who assisted in preparation of de-
fense, does not violate right to counsel), modified, 387 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 955 (1968).
97. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
100. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
101. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
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absolute right to counsel,"° regardless of any consequential cost to soci-
ety.'O5 The right protects attorney-client communications solely to guar-
antee an accused a fair criminal trial, not to promote any public
interest. 106 Thus, under the right to counsel, microcosmic protection is
its own end, rather than, as under the privilege, a means that generates
macrocosmic candor.'07 Accordingly, sixth amendment claimants must
show that an intrusion was prejudicial to the individual to obtain protec-
tive measures. 108
In practice, the attorney-client privilege provides broader protection of
communications than does the right to counsel. The privilege applies to
all attorney-client confidences, 0 9 whereas the right protects only the
criminal defendant seeking legal advice relating to a pending or ongoing
prosecution." 0 Concomitantly, the privilege extends to communications
relating to the purpose of seeking legal advice,"' while the right extends
only to communications relating to the purpose of seeking legal advice
regarding a pending or ongoing criminal action." 2 Finally, unlike the
permanent protection of the attorney-client privilege," t3 the protection
afforded by the right to counsel covers only the period from onset to
termination of formal adversary proceedings.'
104. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
105. See generally F. HELLER, supra note 44.
106. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text. Sixth amendment protection of a particular
attorney-client relationship increases client candor on a macrocosmic level. See supra note 51. If
courts rejected the theory that microcosmic protection engenders macrocosmic candor, see, e.g.,
Note, Functional Overlap, supra note 27, at 1236, then the privilege would have little support beyond
the original "oath and honor" argument. See supra notes 22-23, 28 and accompanying text. The
right to counsel, however, remains entrenched in the Constitution. Furthermore, a court could
properly retract the protection of the privilege in a particular case when a significant reduction of
overall client candor would not result. But see supra note 27 and accompanying text (application of
the privilege requires certainty). A retraction of sixth amendment protection, however, would vio-
late the Constitution regardless of the degree of macrocosmic impact.
108. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. A prejudicial intrusion directly subverts the
microcosmic protection that the right seeks to achieve. A deliberate but unprejudicial intrusion, in
contrast, merely discourages candor at the macrocosmic level. This Note consequently argues that a
deliberate intrusion is neither necessary nor sufficient for a finding of a sixth amendment violation.
But see supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 43.
Ill. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
112. E.g., United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126, 1138 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Sale, 461
F.2d 345, 364 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Cooper, 397 F. Supp. 277, 285-86 (D. Neb. 1975).
113. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 43; see also United States v. Choate, 527 F.2d 748, 751-52 (9th Cir. 1975),
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In some respects, however, the right affords broader protection than
does the privilege. The privilege and the right prevent compelled disclo-
sure by the client or his attorney in court."i 5 The right, however, also
prevents voluntary disclosure by government agents and informants who
improperly obtain confidential information." t6 Furthermore, in some ju-
risdictions, the right protects against prosecutor knowledge," 7 and per-
haps investigator knowledge," 8 of intercepted attorney-client
communications. Some circuits interpret the right more broadly to for-
bid any intentional, albeit fruitless, government intrusion." 9 The privi-
lege excludes only testimony concerning the protected communication,
regardless of the adversary's knowledge or conduct. 2 °
The right also offers broader remedies than does the privilege. To rem-
edy an unconstitutional intrusion, courts not only may suppress evidence
or order a new trial, as under privilege law, but also may dismiss indict-
ments.'' Finally, only the right provides a basis for a claim of
damages. '
22
The attorney-client privilege and the right to counsel also have differ-
ent standards of waiver. The client can waive the privilege either inten-
tionally or implicitly. 123 An accused, in contrast, traditionally waives
sixth amendment protection only when, knowing his rights, he volunta-
rily relinquishes them.' 2
4
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d
594, 634 n.100 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912, 928
(1981), United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 517, 522 (D. Del. 1981), modified, 688 F.2d 919 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1272, 1280 (1983).
115. See supra note 18-19 & 63-69 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 63 & 67 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 86 and accompanying text; see also Bradt v. Smith, 634 F.2d 796, 800 (5th
Cir ) (rejecting the privilege as basis for recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830
(1981). Bradt only rejects the privilege as a basis for a § 1983 claim in the context of civil action in a
state court. Id. Currently, courts have not conferred constitutional status on the privilege. E.g.,
Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 n.15 (1975); Beckler v. Superior Court, 568 F.2d 661, 662 &
n.2 (9th Cir. 1978); OKC Corp. v. Williams, 461 F. Supp. 540, 546 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 614 F.2d
58 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 952 (1980). Future courts may, however, find the privilege to
have constitutional significance in some circumstances. For an argument against attacking a consti-
tutional aspect to the privilege, see supra note 42.
123. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
124. E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). For both the right and the privilege,
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In summary, the right addresses the problem of assuring the individual
a fair trial, while the privilege aims at maintaining a fair system. In prac-
tice, the privilege affords broader protection than does the right insofar
as it protects a wider range of communications, for a longer time. The
right, however, offers broader protection because it restricts a larger
group of people from disclosing information against the defendant's will,
and because it authorizes more extensive remedies. The right to coun-
sel's protection of attorney-client communications also may exceed the
protection of the privilege because unintentional unconfidentiality result-
ing from the defendant's ignorance of his rights may not constitute
waiver.
however, confidentiality is a prerequisite to protection. Eg., United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641,
645-46 (5th Cir. 1981) (attorney-client privilege protects communications intended to be confidential
and made with reasonable expectation of confidentiality); United States v. Gartner, 518 F.2d 633,
637-38 (2d Cir.) (government interception does not violate sixth amendment when communications
are not made in confidence), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 915 (1975).
The defendant, however, can undermine confidentiality without being aware of the resulting loss
of sixth amendment protection. See, eg., United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 646 (5th Cir. 1981)
(confidentiality waived when defendant invites government informant who is not part of defense
team to an attorney-client conference and there is no reasonable expectation of confidentiality). The
resulting unreasonableness of an expectation of confidentiality must be apparent to the defendant.
See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 (1977); United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 646
(5th Cir. 1981).
In light of his ability to undermine confidentiality, it is arguable that the accused can implicitly
waive this aspect of his sixth amendment right. Cf. C. McCORMICK, supra note 12, § 93, at 194-97;
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 11, §§ 2327-29, at 634-41 (materials discussing rationale underlying im-
plicit waiver in context of attorney-client privilege). But cf. Bustamante v. Eyman, 456 F.2d 269,
273-74 (9th Cir. 1972) (defendant is incapable of waiving rights under the confrontation clause of the
sixth amendment).
Regardless of the requirement of confidentiality, a distinction remains between the standard of
waiver that courts apply to the privilege as opposed to that applied in sixth amendment cases in
which the government has the client in its custody. The right to counsel includes the right of incar-
cerated clients to consult privately with their attorney. E.g., Via v. Cliff, 470 F.2d 271, 274-75 (3d
Cir. 1972); Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199, 1213 n.20 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1120
(1968); Moore v. Janing, 427 F. Supp. 567, 575-76 (D. Neb. 1976); Martinez Rodriguez v. Jiminez,
409 F. Supp. 582, 594 (D.P.R.), af'd, 551 F.2d 877 (lst Cir. 1977); Morales v. Turman, 326 F. Supp.
677, 679-80 (E.D. Tex. 1971). Prison officials may, however, impose restrictions necessary to main-
tain security and order. See generally Harrison, Confidentiality of Attorney-Client Consultation in
the Prison Setting, 3:2 N.E.J. PRISON L. 539 (1977). Prisoners also have the right to correspond with
attorneys without undue interference. K-g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 575-76 (1974); Nolan
v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548, 550-51 (1st Cir. 1970); Smith v. Robbins, 328 F. Supp. 162, 164-65 (D. Me.
1971), modified, 454 F.2d 696 (Ist Cir. 1972). Absent facilities affording sufficient privacy, the client
may converse with his attorney without waiving sixth amendment protection of the communication.
E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Because the privilege does not create a right to
private attorney-client consultations, a lack of private facilities does not preclude waiver.
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III. RESOLVING CONFLICTS IN CURRENT SIXTH AMENDMENT
INTRUSION STANDARDS
The tension between the benefits of confidentiality and the cost of an
incomplete factual record justifies similar standards of protection under
the privilege and the right. 25 Similar standards are also appropriate be-
cause both the privilege and the right seek to encourage client candor.126
The right to counsel's distinct goal of protecting the individual from un-
fair prosecutorial advantage, however, may justify different standards of
protection. 127 Currently, the circuits' constitutional restrictions upon
governmental intrusions vary because of disagreement on the issues of
deliberateness, 12 the threshold of prejudice, 129 and protected communi-
cations. 130 Considered jointly, the similarities and differences between
the privilege and the right to counsel provide a basis upon which to re-
solve the disagreement over each of these three issues.
A. Deliberateness
For sixth amendment purposes, a deliberate government intrusion is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient ground for court protection of attor-
ney-client communications.' 3 ' To assure effective assistance of counsel,
the courts must encourage client candor and prevent unfair prosecutorial
advantage.132 Absolute protection of privileged communications, strictly
construed, sufficiently advances the privilege's goal of encouraging client
candor. 33 Logically, absolute protection of communications qualifying
for constitutional protection would sufficiently encourage client candor
for sixth amendment purposes as well. The proper focus, then, should be
upon what the government intercepted and not upon why it committed
the intrusion. Because the prosecutor gains no unfair advantage from an
125. See supra notes 39 & 53 and accompanying text.
126. Compare supra notes 24-38 and accompanying text (client candor justification for attorney-
client privilege) with supra note 51 and accompanying text (client candor rationale for right to
counsel)
127. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
130. Id.
131. Deliberateness may remain relevant when courts attempt to fashion appropriate remedies
for sixth amendment violations. See cases cited supra notes 77-87.
132. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
133, See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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unsuccessful intentional intrusion, the distinction between the goals of
the right and the privilege does not undermine this conclusion.
Proponents of a strict rule against purposeful intrusions argue that by
penalizing such activity, the courts prevent a chilling effect upon client
candor 134 and deter future governmental intrusions. 135 No chilling effect
results, however, if clients know a court will deem a governmental intru-
sion harmless only when the intrusion fails to intercept protected com-
munications. 136  Second, no additional deterrence results from a
prohibition against deliberate intrusions.'37 Agents will have no reason
to attempt to intercept communications if they know they cannot give
the information gained to the prosecutor. 38 While it is possible that an
agent who does not pass intercepted information along to the prosecutor
may sructure his testimony in accordance with that information,139 it
seems unlikely that some "structuring," short of disclosure, will have a
prejudicial effect.'" Inquiring into the motivation for, rather than the
results of, such activities, however, unnecessarily inhibits legitimate gov-
ernment undercover and surveillance activities.'
4 1
B. Threshold of Prejudice
To uphold a meaningful guarantee of the assistance of counsel, courts
must establish government knowledge of protected communications as
the threshold of prejudice. Suppression of use sufficiently advances mac-
rocosmic candor for purposes of the right just as it encourages candor for
purposes of the privilege. When the prosecution becomes aware of de-
134. E.g., Smith v. Robbins, 328 F. Supp. 162, 165 (D. Me. 1971), modified, 454 F.2d 696 (Ist
Cir. 1972); Memorandum of Amici Curiae Regarding Invasion of Joint Defense at 4, United States
v. Pioggia, Cr. No. 82-231-K (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 1983), appeal docket sub nom., United States v.
Barkett, Cr. No. 84-1029 (1st Cir. Jan. 12, 1984).
135. E.g., United States v. Constanzo, 625 F.2d 465, 469 (3d Cir. 1980); Comment, supra note
56, at 211.
136. While the threat of intrusion might chill the disclosure of unprotected information, the fact
that it is unprotected reveals that courts are not concerned with whether the client is candid as to
such information. Cf. Parker v. United States, 358 F.2d 50 n.3 (7th Cir. 1965) (mere possibility of
government intrusion without proof of actual intrusion does not deny right to effective assistance of
counsel).
137. It is important to emphasize "additional." This Note does not assert that a deterrence
argument is meritless. See Note, supra note 87.
138. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
139. See United States v. Orman, 417 F. Supp. 1126, 1136 (D. Colo. 1976).
140. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 556 (1977) (limited scope of investigator's testi-
mony unprejudicial).




fense strategy or other confidential matters, however, it gains an unfair
advantage over the defense. 142 Prosecutorial knowledge thus obstructs
the right to counsel's distinct goal of preventing unfair advantage, neces-
sitating a stricter standard of protection than that available under the
privilege, which seeks only to prevent the use of confidential information.
A knowledge threshold need not unduly inhibit the undercover and
surveillance work of government investigators. 143 "Chinese wall" proce-
dural safeguards, which isolate the attorneys who will prosecute the case
from investigatory personnel, would protect the efficacy of defense coun-
sel's representation. 1"
C. Protected Communications
Uniform adoption of a "knowledge" threshold of prejudice obviates
the need for courts to distinguish between defense strategy and other
confidential matters. Privilege law separates the confidential from the
nonconfidential, as well as communication from underlying fact. 145
These distinctions allow the courts to encourage client candor without
unnecessarily enlarging the scope of protection. Unless the right to
counsel's goal of preventing unfair advantage requires different protec-
tion, these distinctions should govern its scope as well.
The courts apparently justify separate treatment of strategic and non-
strategic information by noting the difficulty of proving use of strategic
information. 146 A "knowledge" threshold renders proof of use unneces-
sary, thereby invalidating the "difficulty of proof" justification. Only
"use" threshold jurisdictions are burdened with the need to distinguish
strategic information from nonstrategic to prevent unfair prosecutorial
advantage.
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts should ignore the government's motives when examining
an interception of attorney-client confidences. Instead courts should fo-
cus upon whether the intrusion resulted in prosecutorial knowledge of
the content of protected communications. A "knowledge" threshold of
142. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
143, See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 139-140 and accompany-
ing text (regarding investigator knowledge).
145. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
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prejudice advances the goal of client candor which underlies both the
privilege and the right. In turn, greater client candor enhances lawyer
effectiveness. In addition, a "knowledge" threshold prevents the prose-
cution from gaining an unfair advantage.
An understanding of the similarities and differences between the attor-
ney-client privilege and the sixth amendment right to counsel also makes
for better lawyering. The privilege prevents a court from compelling at-
torney or client to disclose the content of their confidential communica-
tions: underlying facts remain subject to compelled disclosure. By
knowing when the sixth amendment protection applies, the attorney can
secure for his client much more significant protection. Furthermore,
proficiency in attorney-client privilege and right to counsel principles en-
ables the attorney to cross-apply precedent in appropriate circumstances,
and informs him that it is arguable that the sixth amendment protection
remains despite an inadvertent waiver of the privilege.
Carl James Lumley
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